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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS







RONNIE HOLT, Warden, USP Canaan;
S.I.S INVESTIGATION UNIT, USP Canaan
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-01702)
District Judge:  Honorable Malcolm Muir
___________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 22, 2010
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges





Carlos Ortiz filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to protest the imposition
of sanctions against him, including the loss of good-time credits, after a prison
2investigation and disciplinary hearing at USP – Canaan.  He claimed that prison officials
had violated his right to due process of law, as well as a federal regulation.  The District
Court denied Ortiz’s petition, and Ortiz appeals.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review is plenary.  See
Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2000).  Upon review, we will affirm the
District Court’s decision.
Due process protections attach in prison disciplinary proceedings in which the loss
of good-time credits is at stake.  See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974). 
In Wolff, the Supreme Court held that an inmate must receive “(1) advance written notice
of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety
and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense;
and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for
the disciplinary action.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).  
In Hill, the Supreme Court further explained that  to meet the minimum
requirements of due process, the findings of the prison disciplinary board must also be
supported by some evidence in the record.  See id.  The “some evidence” standard “does
not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.”  Id. at 455.  “[T]he relevant question is whether
there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.”  Id. at 455-56.
     Ortiz states that the District Court should have reviewed the evidence in camera to1
determine whether it supported the prison disciplinary committee’s conclusions. 
However, as we explained above, the District Court is not required to examine the entire
3
Ortiz received the procedural protections set forth in Wolff.  He received notice of
the charges; an opportunity to present evidence and call witnesses; and he received the
written statement that is in the record and describes the evidence on which the factfinder
relied, as well as the reasons for the disciplinary action.  
Ortiz also claimed that a federal regulation and his right to due process were
violated because his hearing was not held within three days from the time prison
personnel become aware of an incident warranting a hearing.  Federal regulations provide
that an initial hearing before a Unit Disciplinary Committee is ordinarily held within
“three work days from the time staff became aware of the inmate’s involvement in the
incident.”  28 C.F.R. § 541.15(b).  The time limit may be extended for good cause shown
and documented in the record.  See id. at § 541.15(k).  In this case, as the District Court
explained, the documented reason for a delay was the need for a revision to the incident
report.  The regulation was not violated.  Furthermore, Ortiz cannot show that his right to
due process was violated by the delay where Wolff did not require that a hearing be held
within three days (or a specific time frame) and where any delay in holding his hearing
did not prejudice him.  See Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 2003).  
The last issue is whether some evidence supported the imposition of sanctions. 
Upon reviewing the record, we conclude that the “some evidence” standard is met.   In1
record, independently assess the credibility of the witnesses, or weigh the evidence.  See 
Hill, 472 U.S. at 455.    
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the record is the hearing officer’s report, which quotes the relevant incident report. 
Although Ortiz maintains that the evidence against him was “non-existent and made up,”
Appellant’s Brief 1, he did not dispute the existence of the incident report, see e.g.,
Petition 4.  His objection that the report was based on hearsay does not change its validity
as evidence against him.  See Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 22 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that
a decisionmaker may rely on hearsay in a prison disciplinary proceeding).  
In the incident report, an investigating officer relied on the statements of other
inmates and transactions in Ortiz’s commissary account to determine that Ortiz possessed
and sold full and partial grams of heroin in prison.  The incident report also cited an
investigation following the arrest of a prison visitor found to be carrying heroin; the
investigation, based on interviews, inmate statements, and telephone recordings, revealed
that the visitor was meeting with a person that Ortiz was using as a drug “mule” or
“carrier.”  In addition, at his hearing Ortiz conceded that he had addressed an envelope
that was found among the release paperwork of another inmate.  The envelope contained
a typed letter (of which Ortiz disavowed ownership) that requested 30 grams of heroin
and was addressed to someone Ortiz described as a friend.  The person carrying the letter
when it was found stated that he had agreed to smuggle out the letter for another inmate. 
Furthermore, Ortiz did not deny that he received funds from other inmates (although he
5stated that he received money because he ran a store of sorts, not because he sold drugs). 
In short, despite Ortiz’s claim to the contrary, “some evidence” supports the prison
disciplinary committee’s finding.  
For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court properly ruled that Ortiz did
not show that his right to due process of law or his rights under the relevant regulation
were violated.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
